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Double-Lock or Double-Bind?  The 
Investigatory Powers Bill and Freedom 
of Expression in the United Kingdom 
‘Double Bind’ 
A situation in which a person is confronted with two irreconcilable demands or a choice 
between two undesirable courses of action.   
(Oxford Dictionary) 
 Introduction/background 
The Snowden revelations, uncovering the scale of surveillance by amongst others, the National 
Security Agency (NSA) in the United States of America and Government Communications 
Headquarters (GCHQ) in the United Kingdom, continue to reverberate.1 From then (summer 2013) 
until now, it can be safely said that international terrorism and its use of modern technology to both 
plan and execute guerrilla style atrocities such as the recent attacks in Turkey, France and Belgium 2 
have changed at a dizzying pace the world in which we live and the context within which 
governments have to attempt to ensure basic safety for citizens. Against this background national 
and international attempts to reconcile rapidly evolving mass surveillance capabilities with 
upholding notions of the rule of law have proven very difficult.  The United Kingdom is no exception.  
The Investigatory Powers Bill (the IP Bill)3 currently being considered by Parliament and set to be 
enacted and in force by the end of 2016 is highly controversial. 
As with all new legislation in the UK, section 19 of the Human Rights Act 1998 requires the Minister 
in charge of a Bill to make a statement as to whether or not it is compatible with Convention4 rights.  
The Home Office duly published a short document in March 2016 noting that the IP Bill engages 
three rights, and extensively dealt with the Bill’s foreseeable impact on the Article 8 right to privacy.5  
Although it admits that the Bill also engages Article 10, the right to freedom of expression, notably 
less attention is given to both the Bill’s impact on this right and the way in which it proposes to deal 
                                                          
1
 For a concise, interactive synopsis of the impact of surveillance culture, the Snowden leak and the virtual 
impossibility of avoiding surveillance in modern society, see Rory Cellan-Jones, Who’s Watching Me on the 
Internet?, BBC iWonder (2016) available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/guides/zyvmhv4, accessed 21 May 2016.  
2
 See Jon Henley and Kareem Shaheen , Suicide bombers in Brussels had known links to Paris attacks, The 
Guardian, (March 23, 2016). 
3
 The Investigatory Powers Bill 2015, HC Bill 143, perhaps tellingly commonly referred to in the media as ‘the 
Snooper’s Charter’.  See Rowena Mason, Anushka Asthana and Alan Travis, ‘Snooper’s charter’: Theresa May 
faces calls to improve bill to protect privacy, The Guardian, (March 15, 2016), accessed April 27,2016. 
4
 European Convention of Human Rights. 
5
 HOME OFFICE, INVESTIGATORY POWERS BILL – EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
MEMORANDUM, (March 8, 2016), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/investigatory-
powers-bill-overarching-documents (last accessed  May 11,2016). 
 2 
 
with such impact.  Similarly campaigners opposing the Bill have mostly rallied around raising privacy 
concerns.6 
It is submitted that not according freedom of expression at least equal weight in this debate is 
unfortunate to say the least, and at most a risky oversight, especially when one considers that very 
recently a major area of the English common law was completely overhauled because of freedom of 
expression concerns with the enactment and coming into force of the Defamation Act 2013. 
This essay therefore puts aside, for the time being, the privacy concerns raised by the IP Bill, and 
instead focuses on its implications for freedom of expression.  How then, to go about judging the Bill?  
A useful framework to follow may be a simple Burkean analysis:  Any proposed change in laws needs 
to start by showing, first, that there’s a need for change; second, that the proposed change will solve 
the problem it claims to solve; and third, that the benefits of the change will outweigh its costs.7  The 
following discussion proceeds broadly along these lines, with the first section examining the current 
state of play in the UK regarding data surveillance and its regulatory framework, the second section 
taking a closer look at the IP Bill and the third section analysing its likely impact against freedom of 
expression in the UK.  Given the length and range of the Bill, the discussion focuses on metadata and 
bulk surveillance. 
1. The problem 
1.1  Current surveillance in the UK  
Residents and visitors to the UK find themselves subject to some of the most intrusive and extensive 
surveillance regimes in the world. In fact, it is no exaggeration to say that the Snowden leaks showed 
that the extent to which the inhabitants of the United Kingdom is already subject to surveillance is 
truly staggering. Not only are surveillance cameras ubiquitous,8 the UK also boasts one of the largest 
DNA databases in the world,9 and the Don’t Spy On Us (DSOU)10 campaign group highlighted that 
                                                          
6
 The third right that is engaged is the right to protection of property contained in Article 1 of the First Protocol 
of the Convention. 
7
 EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE, WORKS OF EDMUND BURKE, VOLUME 3 OF 
12, Kindle Edition 2016.  It is submitted that the pragmatism with which Burke sets about relating abstract 
notions to real life is very useful, especially in the common law.  Therefore, at the risk of oversimplifying, 
Burkean conservatism in the sense used in this essay simply means the application of the precautionary 
principle to the legislative sphere. 
8
 There are estimated to be more than 6 million CCTV cameras active in the UK, with more than 100 000 
publicly operated cameras under the supervision of the Office for Surveillance Commissioners. Matthew 
Weaver interview with Tony Porter, UK public must wake up to risks of CCTV, says surveillance commissioner, 
The Guardian, (January 6 2015). 
9
 The DNA database currently holds details of some 5,156,268 individuals - HOME OFFICE, NATIONAL DNA 
DATABASE STATISTICS, Q4 2015 TO 2016, available at https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/national-
dna-database-statistics, (last accessed May 11, 2016). 
10
 The Don’t Spy On Us (DSOU) campaign is a coalition of organisations that defend privacy, freedom of 
expression and digital rights, and the members of its executive committee are ARTICLE 19, Big Brother Watch, 
English PEN, Liberty, Open Rights Group and Privacy International. See DON’T SPY ON US, REFORMING 
SURVEILLANCE IN THE UK, (September 2014), Joint publication by ARTICLE 19, Big Brother Watch, English PEN, 
Liberty, Open Rights Group and Privacy International, available at 
<https://www.dontspyonus.org.uk/blog/2014/09/19/reforming-surveillance-we-publish-our-policy-paper/ >  
accessed 11 May 2016, p 1. 
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GCHQ through its ‘TEMPORA’ programme was routinely and daily intercepting private 
communications of millions of British residents to the scale of 21 petabytes of data.  To put it in 
context, this translates to the equivalent of downloading the entire British Library 192 times per 
day. 11   The latter large-scale interception enabled GCHQ to construct a huge database of 
communications data, or metadata.  This is significant because the technology on metadata enables 
the construction of a clear picture about individuals, without having to directly analyse the content 
of their communications. So while significant procedural and other safeguards were in place 
regarding the monitoring of individual, targeted communications, the position around metadata and 
bulk communications data was largely without regulation and therefore exploitable, as will become 
clear below. 
1.1.1 Direct surveillance not needed for picture to emerge 
When the IP Bill’s predecessor12 was debated in early 2000, only a quarter of the UK population was 
online, whereas now more than 80 per cent are, with the average household owning several internet 
enabled devices.13    These devices routinely track details of websites their users visit, their location, 
who they chat to or text, etc.  People’s smartphones not only store telephone numbers and 
addresses, but also personal information about their finances, family members, religious and 
political views, medical history and so on.  With current technology it is possible to use this 
information to build up comprehensive pictures of individual lives without the need to listen to calls 
or read emails.14  Stewart Baker, ex-NSA General Counsel, said, “…metadata absolutely tells you 
everything about somebody’s life.  If you have enough metadata, you don’t really need content.”15  
More chillingly, the former director of the NSA and the CIA, General Michael Hayden, asserted, “We 
kill people based on metadata.”16   
It is against this background that reassuring statements from the Office of Surveillance 
Commissioners (the OSC) need to be read:  If one examines the latest report by the OSC, the level of 
direct surveillance in the UK seem reasonable and subject to rigorous oversight.  Indeed, the report 
shows a decrease in instances of authorised surveillance. 17 The OSC therefore felt confident enough 
to reassure the public that its annual statistics show that all such activity that they oversee is 
accounted for, properly authorised according to set procedures and once undertaken, overseen until 
cancelled.  It went on to point out that the number of authorisations for these types of covert 
activity is far less than is sometimes portrayed – but tellingly, it then stated that the seeming ‘over-
portrayal of surveillance’ seems to come from those,”… who continue to confuse these activities 
with the access to communications data powers (Part 1 of RIPA”).18  As seen above, directed 
surveillance is not necessary for a complete picture to emerge or for an individual to be accurately 
                                                          
11
 DSOU p 4. 
12
 THE REGULATION OF INVESTIGATORY POWERS ACT 2000 (‘RIPA’). 
13
 See for up to date statistics on internet use in the UK the OFCOM website at 
http://media.ofcom.org.uk/facts/. 
14
 DSOU, 16.   
15
 David Cole, We Kill People Based on Metadata, New York Review of Books (May 10, 2014). 
16
 Ibid. 
17
 OSC REPORT 2014/2015 p 11-15 dealing with property interference, intrusive surveillance, directed 
surveillance, and covert human intelligence sources. 
18
 OSC REPORT 2014/2015 p 30 para 5.51. 
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profiled – access to metadata is enough.  It is precisely this aspect which the IP Bill proposes to place 
on a legal footing and which is the subject of this discussion. 
1.2  Current legal landscape 
Several key statutes and cases need to be mentioned to place the IP Bill in context.  These include 
the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, the EU’s Data Retention Directive and the case 
(Digital Rights Ireland) which made short shrift of it, and the UK’s response to this in the form of the 
Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014.  The latter, in turn, was deemed to be not fit for 
purpose in the UK’s “Davis case”,19 with a reference to the CJEU currently under way.20 
1.2.1  RIPA – the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 
This Act, which is still in place and therefore forms the bulk of the regulatory framework within 
which surveillance takes place in the UK, was envisaged to ensure that relevant investigatory powers, 
including the interception of communications, acquisition of communications data, intrusive and 
covert surveillance and access to encrypted data are used in accordance with human rights.21 It has 
been more than fifteen years since its inception now, which timespan has witnessed the massive 
expansion of surveillance powers and data analysis capabilities, combined with the rise of social 
media and advances in communications technology.  It is safe to say that nobody still thinks that this 
Act and the regulatory framework it oversees is fit for purpose – developments have outpaced the 
law to such an extent that the massive surveillance operations uncovered by the Snowden 
revelations were by and large legal in the sense that no law was actually breached, mainly because 
the law itself did not envisage the type of data analysis made possible by technological advances.  
The following example from the operation of this Act suffices to illustrate the kind of loopholes 
meant in this discussion.    
The Act is relatively robust in providing checks and balances for targeted interception in the sense of 
interception of communications by and to identified persons, but (much) less so when this is not the 
main route or rationale for the interception. For example, there are strenuous conditions22 attached 
to the issuance of an interception warrant in terms of section 8(1)(a) where a single person can be 
named or identified as the interception subject –  but section 8(4) read with (5) largely removes 
these safeguards if the interception relates to ‘external communications’, for which a lesser warrant 
is obtained.  In this way, section 8(4) warrants could be (and were, per the Snowden revelations) 
used as the basis for mass interception by GCHQ of bulk communications data.23 The Government 
admitted in May 2014 that it understood ‘external communications’ to include, for example, social 
media such as Facebook – so long as the relevant server was outside the UK.24  In fact, many internal 
                                                          
19
 R. (on the application of Davis) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, EWHC 2092 (Admin) [2015]. 
20
 C-698/15 - Davis and Others. 
21
 REGULATION OF INVESTIGATORY POWERS ACT 2000, Explanatory Notes, p 1 par. 3. 
22
 Such as the requirement in s. 8(2) that the warrant must comprise one or more schedules setting out the 
addresses, numbers, apparatus or other factors that are to be used for identifying the communications that 
may be or are to be intercepted, and the targeted nature of such interception is further developed in s. 8(3) 
where it is required that this must be limited to communications that are likely to include communications 
intended to or from the named person. 
23
 DSOU, 11. 
24
 Charles Blandford Farr, Director General of the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism, Witness 
Statement for the Respondents in Privacy International and others against the Secretary of State, GCHQ and 
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messages and most cloud based communications are routed via other countries, and would thus fall 
within this understanding of ‘external communications’.  In addition, regardless of whether 
communications are internal or external, the Act places no restrictions on the collection of 
communications data by GCHQ.25  The result is this:  searches directly referencing identified persons 
(e.g. with the search term ‘Jane Doe’) are not allowed or at least very difficult to warrant, whereas 
searches on the basis of other terms are, as long as the search showed some facet of ‘external 
communications’ or comprised bulk communications data – and in this way even though ‘Jane Doe’ 
may never have been directly named or searched, a comprehensive picture of her could 
nevertheless still be formed by analysing such bulk data.   
A further loophole exists in the distinction between ‘communications’, which are strongly protected, 
and ‘communications data’, which is not.26  In the light of current data analysis capabilities, this 
distinction is arbitrary and useless. 
1.2.2 Data Retention Directive 
Here the focus needs to shift to the  European Union’s Data Retention Directive,27 which mandated 
EU States’ retention of communications data on their entire populations for up to a year in order to 
combat crime by, inter alia, requiring telephone communications service providers to retain traffic 
and location data. 
1.2.3 Digital Rights Ireland case28 
The European Court of Justice was asked for a preliminary ruling on the validity of the Directive.  The 
Court held that EU-mandated mass surveillance “entails an interference with the fundamental rights 
of practically the entire European population”29 and that the interference was not limited to what 
was strictly necessary.30 The blanket retention of communications data as well as the lack of 
independent judicial decision making about access to data was found to be disproportionate.
31
  The 
CJEU therefore declared the Data Retention Directive not compatible with the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union Article 7 (the right to respect for family and private life) 
and Article 8 (the right to protection of personal data). 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
others, cases IPT/13/92/CH; IPT/1377/H; IPT/13/204/CH; IPT/13/168-173/H; IPT/13/204/CH (May 16,2014), 
para 137 and para 138 where the same is repeated for Twitter. 
25
 Section 16(2) provides: “…intercepted material falls within this subsection so far only as it is selected to be 
read, looked at or listened to otherwise than according to a factor which – (a) is referable to an individual who 
is known to be for the time being in the British Islands; and (b) has as its purpose, or one of its purposes, the 
identification of material contained in communications sent by him, or is intended for him.”  In other words, 
only targeted communication falls under the safeguards of ss. 15 and 16 provided in RIPA. 
26
 For example, Part 1 of RIPA dealing with the interception of ‘communications’ require a warrant from the 
Secretary of State, whereas access to communications data under Part 2 requires only authorisation by a 
senior member of the relevant public body. 
27
 DIRECTIVE 2006/24 ON THE RETENTION OF DATA GENERATED OR PROCESSED IN CONNECTION WITH THE 
PROVISION OF PUBLICLY AVAILABLE ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES OR OF PUBLIC 
COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS. 
28
 Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources and others (Joined 
Cases C-293/12, C-594/12), EU:C:2013:845, EU:C:2014:238, [2015] Q.B. 127. 
29
 Id., at para 56. 
30
 Id., at para 65. 
31
 Id., at paras 59 and 62. 
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1.2.2  DRIPA  
In response to the Data Retention Directive, the UK fast-tracked emergency legislation in the form of 
the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 (DRIPA), only for the Act to be declared 
“inconsistent with European Union Law” shortly after the decision in Digital Rights Ireland:   
Davis case 
In a judicial review  jointly pursued by Messrs Davis and Watson (Conservative and Labour Members 
of Parliament respectively) against the Secretary of State,32 the high court held DRIPA incompatible 
with European Union Law as set out in Digital Rights Ireland, on the grounds that section 1 of DRIPA 
is incompatible with Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, to the extent that it does 
not restrict the purposes for which communications data may be accessed to serious crime, and 
access to the data is not made dependent on a prior review by a court or an independent 
administrative body whose decision limits access to and use of the data to what is strictly necessary 
for the purpose of attaining the objective pursued.33   
Rulings by the European Court of Justice (CJEU) in Luxembourg relate to EU regulations and are 
binding on British courts, although the Home Secretary appealed the Davis decision arguing that 
such decisions are not mandatory as far as domestic legislation is concerned.   The Court of Appeal 
agreed - at the end of 2015 it provisionally set out its disagreement with the Divisional Court’s 
finding above.34  In a preliminary ruling which raises fundamental issues regarding the relationship 
between English domestic legislation and European Union law, the Appeal Court expressed the 
provisional view that the judgment of the Court of Justice in Digital Rights Ireland did not lay down, 
in relation to retained communications data, mandatory requirements of EU law with which national 
legislation had to comply.35 The Home Office interprets this as meaning that the CJEU was only 
concerned with the legality of the EU legislation, and that therefore its findings should not be 
applied to domestic legislation.  The government also argues that domestic access regimes should 
not be read as implementing EU law (and as such should not be subject to EU Law and the 
Charter).36  This, it is submitted, is disingenuous given that DRIPA was clearly enacted for the very 
reason of implementing EU law in the UK.37 
The Court of Appeal has referred questions as to the interpretation of the Digital Rights Ireland case 
to the CJEU (C-698/15 - Davis and Others).  At present, a ruling is due in this case together with 
another preliminary reference from Sweden (Tele2). 
Whatever the outcome of the CJEU referral and notwithstanding the UK’s decision to leave the 
European Union as per the referendum result of 24 June 2016, DRIPA is subject to a sunset clause of 
31 December 2016, so new legislation will have to be enacted. 
                                                          
32
 R. (on the application of Davis) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2015] EWHC 2092 (Admin). 
33
 Id., at 114. 
34
 Davis and others EWCA Civ 1185. 
35
 Id., at H2. 
36
 HOME OFFICE op. cit,. para 111, where the Home Office also goes on to say: “Safeguards in domestic access 
regimes should be a matter or the domestic courts. The requirements of the Charter do not in any event go 
beyond the requirements of Article 8, and the provisions of DRIPA are compatible with the Convention.” 
37
 At the time of submitting this article, the United Kingdom have just voted to leave the European Union, 
further complicating for the foreseeable future the status of EU law and of pronouncements by the CJEU. 
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Summing up:  Surveillance and in particular the interception, monitoring and analysis of bulk 
communications data, takes place against a very fragmented legal background.  It is questionable 
whether existing legislation properly addresses this issue in itself, and to the extent that it does, it is 
unclear as to whether Convention and Charter rights are adequately addressed.  Everyone agrees 
that this situation needs to be addressed.38  It is against this background that we turn to the Bill at 
issue. 
2. The Proposed Solution : The Investigatory Powers Bill 2015 (HC Bill 
143) 
2.1  Overview 
The Investigatory Powers Bill (IP Bill) was announced in the Queen’s Speech on 27 May 201539 and 
introduced to the House of Commons on 1 March 2016 after its predecessor the Draft 
Communications Data Bill40  were dealt a death blow by the government’s then coalition partners.  It 
aims to provide a new framework to govern the use and oversight of investigatory powers by law 
enforcement and the security and intelligence services, mainly by changing the existing law relating 
to the use and oversight of these powers. As already mentioned, the new legislation needs to be in 
force by 31 December 2016,41 mainly because DRIPA is subject to a sunset clause by this date. 
According to the UK Government, the proposed legislation does the following three things: 
1. “It brings together all of the powers already available to law enforcement and the security 
and intelligence agencies to obtain communications and data about communications. It 
will make these powers and the safeguards that apply to them clear and understandable. 
2. It radically overhauls the way these powers are authorised and overseen. It introduces a 
‘double-lock’ for interception warrants, so that, following Secretary of State authorisation, 
these (and other warrants) cannot come into force until they have been approved by a 
judge. And it creates a powerful new Investigatory Powers Commissioner to oversee how 
these powers are used. 
3. It ensures powers are fit for the digital age. The bill makes provision for the retention of 
internet connection records for law enforcement to identify the communications service to 
which a device has connected. This will restore capabilities that have been lost as a result 
of changes in the way people communicate.”42 
 
The Bill itself is certainly long and complex – it comprises 233 sections split in nine parts with a 
further ten schedules, spanning some 260 pages (the annotated version spans 701 pages).  To this 
should be added six draft codes of practice setting out how powers and obligations will work in 
                                                          
38
 See the comprehensive review of investigatory powers legislation commissioned by Parliament:  DAVID 
ANDERSON QC, A QUESTION OF TRUST: REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATORY POWERS REVIEW, (June 2015). 
39
 HANSARD, HOUSE OF COMMONS Vol.596 col.32 (May 27, 2015). 
40 (London, 2012), Cm.8359. 
41
 HOME OFFICE, INVESTIGATORY POWERS BILL, Published March 1, 2016, updated March 4, 2016, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/investigatory-powers-bill (last accessed May 9, 2016). 
42
 The Chapeau to the Bill reads as follows: “Make provision about the interception of communications, 
equipment interference and the acquisition and retention of communications data, bulk personal datasets and 
other information; to make provision about the treatment of material held as a result of such interception, 
equipment interference or acquisition or retention; to establish the Investigatory Powers Commissioner and 
other Judicial Commissioners and make provision about them and other oversight arrangements.” 
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practice, adding a further 409 pages of legislation to an already bulky proposed statute.43  The Bill 
engages the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), in particular Article 8 (right to respect 
for private and family life), Article 10 (freedom of expression) and Article 1 of the First Protocol of 
the Convention (protection of property). 
The proposed legislation has so far been met with ambivalence, to say the least: After largely 
incorporating comments by the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, the 
Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament and a Joint Committee of both Houses of 
Parliament, the IP Bill passed its second reading in the House of Commons on 15 March 2016 with 
281 votes for and just 15 against,44 but this must be placed in context:  The Labour party (the official 
opposition) and the Scottish National Party (SNP) abstained from voting, indicating unease with the 
Bill without at this stage completely blocking its progress through Parliament.  What is more, almost 
50 Conservative MPs were absent, which may indicate that a large faction in the ruling party may 
not be satisfied with the Bill as it currently stands.    
So, which features of this comprehensive and very large piece of legislation stand out?  For present 
purposes, the provisions regarding the interception and monitoring of communications data need to 
be examined, as well as the so-called ‘double-lock’ process which is meant to be its main safeguard 
against abuses and a guarantor of due process. 
 
2.1.1  The ‘Double-Lock’ process 
The Bill will provide for an authorisation process under which warrants will be issued by the 
Secretary of State but will not come into force until approved by a Judicial Commissioner.  This 
‘double-lock’ process is much vaunted by the government as a fundamental safeguard to ensure that 
decisions to issue warrants must be subject to independent judges (called Judicial Commissioners in 
the Bill.)  The double lock process will apply to warrants authorising, among others:  interception of 
communication;45 targeted equipment interference by the security and intelligence agencies and the 
Ministry of Defence;46 bulk equipment interference;47 the acquisition of communications data in 
bulk;48  the obtaining, retaining and examination of bulk personal data by the security and 
intelligence agencies.49  
The process is, at first glance, undeniably an improvement on previous uncertainty in that unilateral 
decisions are made impossible: The decision to issue a warrant must be taken personally by the 
Secretary of State, based on considerations including whether or not the warrant is necessary and 
proportionate.  The decision then needs to be reviewed and approved by a Judicial 
                                                          
43
 The government published six draft codes of practice setting out how powers and obligations will work in 
practice.  It is envisaged that the codes will be approved by Parliament and will have statutory force.   They are 
the draft codes of practice on:  National security notices (19 pages); Interception of communications (101 
pages); Security and intelligence agencies’ retention and use of bulk personal datasets (38 pages); Equipment 
interference (83 pages); Communications data (118 pages); and Bulk acquisition (50 pages). 
44
 HANSARD, HOUSE OF COMMONS Vol. 607 col. 907 (March 15, 2016). 
45
 Clause 19. 
46
 Clause 90. 
47
 Clause 138. 
48
 Clauses 109 and 123. 
49
 Clause 155. 
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Commissioner50according to the principles that would apply on judicial review. In this way the 
government proposes to guarantee that warrants are necessary, proportionate and lawful – i.e. by 
having a judge involved in assessing them as such. When warrants are to be renewed Judicial 
Commissioners are to provide the same safeguard. 
The double-lock authorisation process was endorsed by the Committees that conducted pre-
legislative scrutiny of the Bill.51  And, in his extensive review of surveillance legislation, David 
Anderson QC recommended the executive as the primary authoriser with the judicial or independent 
authoriser controlling executive decisions by applying judicial review principles.52   It is on this latter 
point that the double lock process may be criticized because, although in judicial review a judge 
reviews the lawfulness of a decision or action made by a public body, this is constrained to 
evaluating the form of the decision making process, rather than the substance of the decision.  In 
other words, judicial reviews are a challenge to the way in which a decision has been made, rather 
than the rights and wrongs of the conclusion reached.53 A strong case could be made for the 
argument that judicial oversight without the power to assess the substance of the government’s 
decision amounts to very little oversight. 
2.1.2  Retention of Communications data 
The bill replicates broadly the existing statutory regimes by means of which telecoms operators can 
be required to retain communications, replacing ss1 and 2 of DRIPA and Part 11 of the Anti-
Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001.54  It also largely replicates the effect of Chapter 2 of Part 1 of 
RIPA, providing public authorities with the power to acquire communications data, which will 
include the power to require the retention of Internet Connection Records (ICRs), which are classed 
as a form of communications data.  This largely replicates the problems arising from the Digital 
Rights Ireland case55 that DRIPA attempted to address, and in the light of the referral of the Davis 
case to the CJEU, 56remains a problem until clarification is given by that Court.  
2.1.3 Bulk  data collection and retention 
It has already been mentioned how the Snowden leaks revealed that the scope of GCHQ surveillance 
under TEMPORA,57  stretched to the interception of millions of private communications and 
collection of bulk communications data.58 Perhaps because of technological advances outracing the 
law, then extant legislation covering the intelligence services (such as the Security Service Act 1989 
and the Intelligence Services Act 1994), through their silence on bulk data collection provided 
                                                          
50
 Judicial Commissioners will be former or serving High Court judges. 
51
 HOME OFFICE, HUMAN RIGHTS MEMORANDUM 2016, op. cit., para 27. 
52
 DAVID ANDERSON QC, INDEPENDENT REVIEWER OF TERRORISM LEGISLATION, A QUESTION OF TRUST: 
REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATORY POWERS REVIEW, (Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, June 2015), 
recommendations 84-88, 14.95. 
53
 JUDICIARY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, JUDICIAL REVIEW, (May 12, 2016), https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/you-
and-the-judiciary/judicial-review/ accessed 15 May 2016. 
54
 HOME OFFICE, HUMAN RIGHTS MEMORANDUM 2016, op. cit., p.2. 
55
 See 1.2.1 above. 
56
 See 1.2.2 above. 
57
  By using warrants for the interception of ‘external communications’ under section 8(4) RIPA. 
58
 DSOU, 11. 
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loopholes for GCHQ to obtain bulk communications data, as well as private communications of 
millions of UK residents from foreign partners such as the NSA.59   
With the IP Bill, the government’s response to this seems to be not to condemn or close these 
loopholes but to give them legal sanction by explicitly building them into new legislation.  For 
example, in its Section 19 statement in terms of the Human Rights Act 1998, the government 
comments on the Bill’s proposed sanction of bulk personal data collection that,  “[t]he security and 
intelligence agencies have existing statutory powers which enable them to acquire and use large 
datasets containing personal data.  The Bill will not create a new power but will create 
safeguards…”60 Professor Joseph Canatacci, the UN Special Rapporteur on Privacy (SRP) quite rightly 
stated that, ‘…disproportionate, privacy-intrusive measures such as bulk surveillance and bulk 
hacking as contemplated in the Investigatory Powers Bill [should] be outlawed rather than 
legitimised.’61 
2.1.4 Secrecy requirement 
In addition to any consideration about the IP Bill, its secrecy provisions, particularly sections 49 read 
with 50 should be kept in mind.  These are draconian:  Not only do they prohibit any information to 
be published or communicated about any surveillance, surveillance request, data request or warrant, 
they prohibit in absolute terms any revelation that such a request was made in the first place and 
they apply automatically to any warrant. 
2.1.5  In summary:  
The IP Bill is to be lauded for the ‘double-lock’ requirement that interception is overseen by judges 
who need to grant warrants, but it should not be overlooked that in turn, it hands law enforcement 
agencies more access to individuals’ internet connection records than ever before:  It requires web 
and phone companies to store records of websites visited by every citizen for 12 months for access 
by police, security services and other public bodies.  For the first time ever it makes it legally explicit 
that security services have the power to collect in bulk large volumes of personal communications 
data, and security services and police have the power to hack into and bug computers and phones 
and what is more, a new legal obligation is placed on companies to assist in these operations to 
bypass encryption.62 Recently in the US, the government backed down over forcing tech giant Apple 
to unlock a terrorist’s iPhone – under the IP Bill, if the same scenario plays out in the UK, Apple 
would be under a legal obligation to comply with such a request.63 
                                                          
59
 DSOU, 11.  See also the Government’s Open Response to the claims brought by Liberty and Privacy 
International before the Investigatory Powers Tribunal in relation to Prism and Tempora, para 194.3. 
60
 HOME OFFICE, HUMAN RIGHTS MEMORANDUM, 2016 p. 3 para 12. 
61
 JOSEPH A. CANATACI, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY, (UN Human Rights 
Council, March 8, 2016) A/HRC/31/64, p 14. 
62
 Alan Travis, Investigatory powers bill: the key points, The Guardian, (Nov 4, 2015), available at 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/04/investigatory-powers-bill-the-key-points (last accessed 
June 27, 2016). 
63
 Devlin Barrett and Daisuke Wakabayashi, FBI Opens San Bernardino Shooter’s iPhone; U.S. Drops Demand on 
Apple – Move delays a high-stakes showdown between Washington, Silicon Valley, The Wall Street Journal, 
(March 28, 2016), available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/fbi-unlocks-terrorists-iphone-without-apples-help-
1459202353 (accessed 16 May 2016).  See also Richard Yorke,  Silencing the Canary: the lawfulness of the U.K. 
Investigatory Powers Bill’s secrecy provisions under the ECHR, EJIL: Talk! Blog of the European Journal of 
 11 
 
 
2.2  Arguments for and against  the IP Bill 
GCHQ and the Government backers of the Bill argue that bulk interception is necessary as a first step 
in the process of fighting terrorism and crime. Nobody disagrees that the sophisticated and unique 
modern iterations of both terrorism and organised crime necessitate a strong response.64  The way 
in which this is done is of course contentious.  GCHQ argues that the necessary second step is a 
targeted search of this data carried out under legal warrants and this means, according to them, that 
the vast majority of intercepted material is never read.  A problem with this line of thinking is of 
course that even if the majority of data is indeed not read, the mere fact of authorising bulk 
interception legitimises mass surveillance.65  Furthermore, as was pointed out earlier, data could be 
analysed to a remarkably precise degree without having to be read, as such.  
The complex and controversial bill has, for this and other reasons, been the subject of fierce 
opposition and criticism, including two hundred leading lawyers representing the legal profession 
and forty UK law schools, as well as the United Nations Special Rapporteur on privacy.66   A short 
scrutiny of changes suggested by the Labour party highlight some of the more obvious shortcomings 
of the Bill:   
 “A clear definition of protecting ‘national security’ and ‘economic wellbeing’, which are 
the current conditions that justify the use of the new powers;  
 A proportionate list of crimes that would justify allowing police and security services to 
access someone’s internet connection record;  
 Restrictions on the number of law enforcement agencies that would be allowed to use the 
legislation; Better protections for the confidential communications of ‘sensitive 
professions’ such as MPs with constitutents, lawyers with clients and journalists with 
sources;  
 Approval for interception to be granted by judges on the basis of the evidence rather than 
merely whether the right process has been followed.” 67 
3. Cost-Benefit analysis 
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The focus now needs to turn to the third part of this analysis, judging the likelihood of the proposed 
legislative reform achieving its stated aims (such as prevention of terrorist atrocities) against its 
likely impacts, in this instance on freedom of expression in the UK. 
3.1 Why protect Freedom of Expression? 
Western philosophy recognised freedom of speech long before its inclusion in the 1948 Human 
Rights Declaration:  Mill’s classic essay ‘Of the Liberty of Thought and Discussion’, dating back to 
1859, has proven to be an enduring starting point on the topic.68 Today freedom of expression is one 
of the most highly valued human rights, with almost universal acceptance as a sine qua non for 
democratic societies.  To name but a few: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognises this 
right in Article 19, the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) recognises it in Article 10 
(Freedom of Expression)69 and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the EU 
Charter) recognises in Article 11 the right to freedom of expression and information.70 Free speech is 
therefore undeniably an established right.  But every now and again, especially when faced with a 
situation where it may be affected, for example by proposed legislation such as the IP Bill, it is a 
good idea to take a step back and re-examine the reasons why it is deemed necessary to protect free 
speech.   Only in such manner can the interests served by this right be judged against the interests 
served by the proposed infringing measure, and a proper balance sought. 
Eric Barendt in his seminal work Freedom of Speech provides a clear and concise summary and 
analysis of the overarching reasons for protection this right. 71  In essence, there are four almost 
universally recognised arguments in favour of a Free Speech Principle:  The argument concerning the 
importance of discovering truth; Free speech as an aspect of self-fulfilment; The argument from 
citizen participation in a democracy; and Suspicion of government.   It is immediately evident that if 
freedom of expression is indeed impacted negatively by the IP Bill, all four arguments may be 
engaged.  The four arguments feed into the protection of the following interests:  The speaker’s 
interest in communicating ideas and information; The audience’s interest in receiving ideas and 
information; and the bystanders’ (or public) interest in speech.72  Of course the right to freedom of 
expression is not absolute and needs to be balanced against other values.  For example, hate speech 
must be curbed in order to protect the right to human dignity.  Nevertheless free speech is 
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important enough to be granted constitutional protection.  In cases where free speech become 
constrained, we now commonly speak of the ‘chilling effect’. 
It is recognised that the State poses actual dangers with regard to freedom of speech, albeit in their 
modern iteration radically different from even a few decades ago.  Koltay,73 for instance, points out 
that the possibility of direct limitation of freedom of speech by the State is today severely restrained 
and circumscribed by constitutional guarantees and judicial precedent.  However, indirect action by 
the State may nevertheless serve to constrain freedom of speech:   To take but one example, 
deregulation of the media (or other areas of civic life), in effect transfers control of public discourse 
to powerful private interests, thus undermining the very raison d’être of a free and independent 
press to further a free and frank exchange of a variety of views.  Similarly in our analysis the 
proposed legislation, once enacted and once its implications become clear to the public, may 
transform public discourse by skewing the free and frank exchange of ideas and information.   
Wright rightly highlights the view that abuse of mass surveillance may be inimical to democracy as it 
erodes the trust between government and the governed and the civic sphere:  ‘There is no such 
thing as benign surveillance.  It always comes with costs because of the chill it visits on conduct, 
education, associations, and expression’.74 We therefore need to examine the chilling effect in terms 
of its effect on state action and its standing as a concept recognised in law in the UK and Europe. 
3.2 Existing concern about chilling effect 
3.2.1 The chilling effect in European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence 
It has been noted that the ECtHR often remarks that certain measures and sanctions interfering with 
the right to freedom of expression have a "chilling effect".75  Although mention of the chilling effect 
is not limited to freedom of expression jurisprudence under art.10, it arises in that context the most. 
Furthermore, it has been applied in relation to a variety of state interferences, including for example 
abortion laws,76 and interferences with the right of individual petition under art.34.77 One scholar 
reckoned that the phrase had been mentioned in over 100 judgments up to 2013, (so it is surprising 
that at the same time there has been a notable absence of scholarly attention to the judicial 
significance of this chilling effect principle.)78  
In essence, the ECtHR jurisprudence seem to indicate that only a narrow margin should be allowed 
to a state when the restriction of free speech concerns political speech or is likely to discourage 
people from making criticisms or contributing to public discussion of issues affecting the life of the 
community.79 Two remarks may be made here:  A vote to leave the European Union does not affect, 
without more, the UK’s relationship with the European Court of Human Rights and its jurisprudence 
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and therefore until such time as (and if) the UK ends this relationship, the ECHR and the decisions by 
the ECtHR will continue to play an important part in domestic jurisprudence.  Secondly, the ECtHR’s 
jurisprudence relevant to the IP Bill’s likely impact on freedom of expression unfortunately seems to 
have fallen by the wayside – at least as far as the discussion of the proposed legislation is concerned.  
Anecdotally, for instance, the author counted in the May 2016 Parliamentary debate of the IP Bill,80 
more than a hundred mentions of the word ‘privacy’ by MPs representing the full range of British 
political parties whereas in the same debate ‘freedom of speech’ was mentioned twice, and 
‘freedom of expression’ once only.81 
Furthermore, the ECtHR has also clearly ruled in Vereniging Weekblad Bluf! V Netherlands that 
legislation that prohibits the dissemination of national security information which eliminates public 
control over intelligence services’ activities, in absolute and unconditional terms, constitutes a 
breach of art. 10 as it goes beyond what is necessary in a democratic society.82 It could be argued 
that requiring telecoms operators to retain and hand over to the government bulk data, combined 
with the secrecy requirement fall foul of the Vereniging Weekblad Bluf! ruling. 
3.2.2 The chilling effect in the UK 
Activists have long pointed out that the United Kingdom needs to be concerned about its protection 
of the right to free speech: For some time these concerns have been centred round the UK’s libel law 
which was perceived to stifle free and frank exchange of ideas. The European Parliament, for 
example, in May 2012 termed the defamation regime in England and Wales ‘the most claimant-
friendly in the world’.83  As such it was argued to have a chilling effect on freedom of expression, in 
that the mere threat of a libel action could serve as a deterrent to speech.  Since such a chilling 
effect is in reality a form of self-censorship, it is particularly difficult to gauge.  Nevertheless, the 
chilling effect was considered real enough to prompt the wholesale reform of English defamation 
law, which culminated in the Defamation Act 2013.   
It would be ironic if one area of the law is substantially reformed to encourage freedom of speech 
whilst shortly afterward another legal regime is established that possibly (hopefully) unintentionally 
reintroduces the chilling effect.  The Home Office acknowledges ‘…the possibility of interception has 
the ability to discourage freedom of expression and public discourse and therefore interfere with 
Article 10 rights’ but in contrast to its extensive response to privacy concerns raised by campaigners, 
say little about how Article 10 infringement will be countered.84  
Conclusion 
On the one hand we have legislation that aims to prevent major acts of terrorism partly by curtailing 
civil rights such as freedom of expression.  But how do we judge whether this will work?  Can the (so 
far since the London attacks of 2005 and hopefully continued) absence of major terrorist atrocities in 
the UK on the scale recently witnessed in Europe and the Middle East be seen as proof of the 
efficacy of covert and overt surveillance?  These operations are by their nature veiled in secrecy – 
and if they have so far succeeded in preventing crime or terrorist activity, the government is keeping 
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quiet.  Anecdotally, it would seem that most of the possible terrorist attacks planned in the UK were 
prevented through means other than intrusive surveillance: informants, old fashioned boots on the 
ground police work, and blind luck seem to have been the main bulwarks in this area.85  On the other 
hand we have a right, the exercise of which is difficult if not impossible to gauge.  It is difficult to 
measure whether free speech is or has been chilled -  and even more so to predict the likely effect in 
future.  What is certain, and had been convincingly argued before, is that the impact of mass 
surveillance could potentially affect the exercise of expressive freedoms to such an extent that it 
may pose a threat to the very idea of democracy itself.86 
Thomas Jefferson’s famous sentiment was that freedom of expression ‘cannot be limited without 
being lost.’87 Yet experience has shown that absolute freedom of expression either is not workable 
or comes at (perhaps) too high a price.  It already seems as if it is inevitable that in modern life a 
large degree of individual privacy must be sacrificed on the altar of public security.  Will the same 
fate befall public and private discourse?  In effect, what the government seems to be presenting us 
with is a double bind; the choice between two evils, and its answer with the IP Bill seems to be that 
less freedom of expression, measured against safety, security and crime, is the lesser of two evils.  
This is a presumption that cannot be allowed to go unchallenged. The author hopes that at least the 
same consideration and thought currently being devoted to privacy concerns will be accorded to 
free speech, before the IP Bill becomes law. 
The following sentiment perhaps puts it best:  
“History … teaches us that ideals (this time the ideal of freedom of speech) that we long for so 
much have (and could never and nowhere) been realised in full. Freedom of speech is an ideal, 
an unattainable mirage which, as we try to approach it, first loses its contours, then becomes 
blurry and finally dissipates without a trace in the hot summer air. However, it does not entitle 
us to quit making increasingly desperate efforts to get closer to it anyway.”88 
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